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(1) The paper by CAMERON AND KORNHAUSER [2005] is the second in a line that
attempts to explain the function of tiers of judicial decisionmakers. The goal is to
relate the rules that courts use to the litigants’ decisions whether to appeal adverse
verdicts or not. This is a challenging problem if the modeler makes the realistic
assumptions that the litigants sometimes lack information about their adversary’s
type, and that the courts also often will lack this information.
(2) This is an important and original topic that is approached in a serious and
systematic way. The current paper is, I think, an advance on the authors’ earlier
work because its information assumptions are more plausible. And as the end of the
paper reveals, there is more interesting work to do.
(3) This Comment is in the spirit of helping the project along, so it may relate as
much to future work as to the current paper. My remarks largely involve a request
for further explanation. Given the novelty of the topic and my innocence of the law
of Civil Procedure, there is a lot here that is not clear to me, and that may not be
clear to other readers.
2 Modeling Choices and Domain
(1) In their prior paper, the authors identify two approaches to the relation among
courts in a judicial hierarchy. The principal/agent approach (PA) views courts as
political actors who decide cases in order to implement their policy preferences.
The team approach (TA) views courts as members of a team with a common goal,
which is to reach correct decisions.
(2) Both approaches hold that, in a judge’s view, a correct decision implements
the judge’s policy preferences. The PA approach thus permits a higher court to
differ from a lower court or an administrative agency because the two sets of
decisionmakers have different preferences. The higher court’s task, in part, is to
control deviations by the lower court or the agency from the higher court’s policy
preferences. In this model, the legislature attempts to control deviations by the courts
from the current political consensus.
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(3) In the TA, every judge has the same policy preferences. Hence, a higher court
could differ from a lower court only if (a) the lower court mistakenly applied the law
to the facts; or (b) judges observe party types imperfectly and the higher and lower
courts received different signals of the appellant’s type. An important preliminary
question is which approach is best when studying the relation of courts inter se.
(4) This paper adopts the team approach but does not attempt to justify this
modeling choice. The authors say, in their prior paper, that the TA is best for
“normal” cases. This defines a normal case as one where higher and lower courts
have the same policy preferences. The paper makes a general analysis, however, so
there is a question how high in any system the ratio of this paper’s “normal” cases
is to total cases. This question is not addressed.
(5) Further along this line here is a large literature in political science studying
courts and the relation among them. Just about every paper in this literature appears
to adopt the PA. This choice is justified on two bases. First, is realism. Courts have
policy preferences, appointing authorities such as chief executives and legislatures
act as if those preferences matter, and judicial dissents and other informal evidence
of judicial decisionmaking appears to show that policy preferences differ across
judges. Second, empirical predictions of PA political science models have substantial
empirical support.
(6) The authors make no effort in the instant paper, and very little effort in their
prior paper, to justify their adoption of the team approach. My own view is that the
team approach is implausible, at least as applied to US and common law countries.
In these countries, courts appear not to act as if they wear the same uniforms and
march to the same songs. The PA approach to questions of the type considered here
is so well established and so seemingly plausible that (a) the paper’s most basic
modeling choice needs more justification; or (b) the paper should identify the court
systems that are best modeled with the TA.
(7) My second concern is domain, and I have a similar question. Are there real
world institutions that the analysis here can explain? In the model, the first tier court
presides over a trial. The judge receives a public signal of the defendant’s type.
A “hard signal” consists of “public, legally admissible, and verifiable evidence” that
reveals the type, but this signal is received with probability π t < 1. A “soft” public
signal does not reveal a party’s type.
(8) If there is an appeal, the higher tier court receives a second public signal, which
also can be hard or soft. The paper recognizes that in the US and the UK, among
other places, no new facts can be introduced at the appellate level. Put another way,
the appellate courts in these countries cannot receive signals. Thus the domain of
the model here appears to exclude US and common law judicial systems. Rather,
the model applies to systems in which a later court provides de novo review of the
initial factual determination. The later court, that is, also adjudicates the facts. The
paper would be better motivated if one such system were described.
(9) There is a minor and perhaps a more serious concern regarding these systems.
First, the paper uses terms such as “tier” and “hierarchy,” but when there is later de
novo review, it is more natural to say that courts function serially, not in a hierarchy.
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Of greater concern, the model here supposes that the initial court, if it is uncertain
of the defendant’s type, always picks the type that is most favorable to the plaintiff
(i.e., the court holds the defendant liable). Every system that I know of, in the usual
case, imposes the burden of proof on the plaintiff, so that if the court does not
know the defendant’s type, it picks the type that is least favorable to the plaintiff.
In addition, in the model here the first appellate court always reverses the decision
below, but in most systems appeals succeed with positive probability.
(10) In sum, the model in this paper permits the second and third tier courts
to get new facts, it imposes the burden of proof on the defendant, and it has the
appellate court always reversing. The paper does establish the equilibria that these
assumptions imply, but the question remains just which real world judicial systems
these equilibria could describe. This question should be addressed.
3 More Particular Questions
(1) Perhaps following from the above, the paper does not generate empirical pre-
dictions, and it is not obvious how the analysis could be tested. What evidence
could be advanced that would make one more or less willing to accept the story
here?
(2) The equilibria are importantly driven by the quality of the higher courts.
In the prior paper, court quality was said to decline monotonically as a court’s
case load increases. There is a question whether judges that see more cases de-
cide them worse. To the contrary, a view holds that cases educate courts so that,
over a range, courts do better when their caseload increases. The paper could bet-
ter motivate its assumption regarding the effect of caseload on court quality, or
should say whether the results would change if quality had a global maximization
point for caseload. Also, the number of judges is a political variable. Hence, if
one is explaining real systems, a later paper in this line should determine quality
endogenously.
(3) The context in the paper is a possible tort, that the defendant either committed
or did not. In this context, it is plausible to suppose that the plaintiff could see more
evidence than the trial court: some such evidence may be unverifiable. The contract
theory literature shows, in contrast, that parties will contract only on the basis of
verifiable information. If this is right, the distinction between public and private
signals collapses for cases involving contract disputes. This is because all evidence
relevant to, say, whether a party breached or not would be “hard” (i.e., verifiable).
The paper purports to explain the existence and function of judicial tiers that decide
all categories of case. It may lack this much generality even in systems where later
courts also make factual determinations.
(4) Finally, the paper could set out a little more intuition for its results. As an
example, in the domain of Proposition 1, the team of trial and appellate judges elim-
inates all errors. This is because the appellate court is highly accurate in ascertaining
the defendant’s type. Recalling that π t is the probability that a court will recognize
Alan Schwartz302 JITE 161
party types, c is the cost of an appeal and d is the damages a liable defendant must
pay, the accurate equilibrium occurs when
π2 > (d − c)/d .
The right hand side of this expression is increasing in d and decreasing in c. Thus,
to eliminate all errors the appellate court must be very accurate when damages are
high relative to appeal costs, but the appellate court can be less accurate when appeal
costs are high relative to damages. It would be nice to have some intuition for this
result.
4 Summary
The authors have a great topic and they are approaching it in an admirably rigorous
way. In this, or in later papers, they should better motivate their choice of the team
approach, give examples of real institutions to which the analysis might apply,
develop some testable predictions, better explain the factors that determine judicial
accuracy and, for many readers, provide more intuition than they do.
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